代写论文的网站：关于LOLR的政策和应用
作为最后的贷款人，美国和欧洲都在寻求帮助。美国联邦储备委员会(fed)向金融机构提供信贷，以防在其它地方无法获得信贷，而信贷崩溃将导致严重的经济影响。这一角色由美联储(fed)从自由银行业时代运作的私营部门“清算所”手中接过。根据联邦储备系统的LOLR政策，该系统拥有权力和财政资源，在涉及国家或地区紧急情况的不寻常情况下，通过对存款机构或其他组织的信贷扩张，作为LOLR (Gorton et al.， 2013)。这里的条件是获取资本的失败将导致对经济产生严重的不利影响。银行系统通过贴现和信贷业务，为银行提供短期流动性，以满足因意外存取款的季节性波动而产生的短期需求。长期流动性也可能在特殊情况下提供。对于这些贷款，美联储向银行收取贴现率(Gorton et al.， 2013)。通过发放此类贷款，美联储充当了一个缓冲器，以应对需求和供应储备中出现的意外波动。反过来，这将有助于有效发挥银行系统的功能，减轻市场储备的压力，并降低利率内的意外波动程度。联邦储备系统作为LOLR的角色也受到了严厉的批评，因为它将风险和责任从借贷中转移出来，并以通胀的形式将这些风险置于其他风险之上。
为了履行LOLR的责任，该制度有几项权力，这些权力反过来至少反映了某些措施，在大多数情况下，这需要采取行动。对于普遍的流动性不足，开放市场中的开放权力和贴现窗口的普通设施应该是(Gorton et al.， 2013)。普遍的流动性不足具有某些历史上发生过的危机的特征，这些危机当时是通过中央银行机构解决的，并符合白芝浩的规则，即以较高的利率自由放贷。
紧急情况下贷款的专门权力特别适用于非流动性集中于某一机构而不扩散到其他市场的情况。
代写论文的网站：关于LOLR的政策和应用
As the lender of last resort, the U.S Federal Reserve extends credit towards finance based institutes in case when credit cannot be obtained elsewhere and the collapse of this would lead towards serious economic implications. This role was taken over by Federal Reserve from privatised sector “clear houses” that operated in the era of free banking. As per the policy on LOLR for Federal Reserve System, the system has authorities and finance resources for acting as the LOLR through credit extension towards deposit based institutions or for other organizations in unusual situations involving an emergency nationally or regionally (Gorton et al., 2013). Here the condition is failure of obtaining capital would result in severe influence of adverse nature over the economy. By the operations of discount and credit, the banking systems engages in providing liquidity for banks for meeting requirement in the short term that stems from fluctuations of seasonal nature within unexpected withdrawals and deposits. Long term liquidity might also be provided in situations that are exceptional. For these loans the fed charges banks a discount rate (Gorton et al., 2013). Through making such loans, the Fed acts as a buffer in opposition to fluctuations that are unexpected within the demand and supply reserve. In turn this leads towards contributing to effective banking system functioning alleviating pressure in market reserves and reducing the unexpected movement extent within rates of interest. The role of Federal Reserve System as LOLR has also been severely criticized as it transitions the risks as well as responsibilities from those borrowing and lending and positions these over others in inflation form.
For meeting the responsibilities of LOLR, the system has several powers that in turn reflect at the least over certain measures and in most of the cases this calls for action. For a generalized liquidity inadequacy, open power in open market and discount window ordinary facilities are as should be (Gorton et al., 2013). A generalized inadequate liquidity has certain features of some crisis occurred historically that were then met through the central banking institutes and in alignment with the rule of Bagehot dealt through lending in a free way with a higher rate.
The specialized powers for lending in case of emergency are particularly appropriate for the situation where illiquidity focuses over a specific institute without spread to the remaining market.
