The cost of these benefits rose fourfold in 18 years, mainly as a result of an increase in the length of time people remained on them (Berthoud, 1998). The relative increase in the supply of labour as unemployment grew in the 1980s enabled employers to be more selective in their choice of staff, effectively excluding disabled people from the workforce. Although New Labour policy towards work for disabled people is almost exclusively focused on the supply side of the labour market, measures to promote work
incentives have generally ‘failed to translate into satisfactory employment opportunities’ (Hyde, 2000, p. 331). Insofar as disabled people do enter employment, they are likely to fill manual, unskilled and part-time jobs. However, as Hyde (2000, p. 337) acknowledges, a ‘reserve army’ thesis cannot adequately explain current government policy, since it is not a response to labour shortage. What policy clearly does do is to reinforce a work ethic, and increase the overall functioning of the labour market by increasing competition for jobs. Thus expenditure on in-work benefits and other measures to encourage the disabled to seek work may be regarded as an investment in the effectiveness of the labour market, rather than simply as a fiscal burden on the state like traditional disability benefits. This extension of in-work benefits is different
to the Thatcherite strategy of simply reducing the real value of out-of-work benefits. An application of the concepts reviewed in this article to New Labour’s policies must therefore lead us to the conclusion that they have transformed the benefit system into a tool of commodification, drawing into the labour market not just the long-term unemployed, but also those previously exempted from it as a result of parenthood or disability.
激励通常无法转化为满意的就业机会”（海德，2000，p. 331）。因为残疾人做进入就业，他们很可能会填补手册，技术不熟练，兼职工作。然而，海德（2000，p. 337）承认，“后备军”的论文不能充分解释政府当前的政策，因为它不是劳动力短缺的响应。显然做的是加强职业道德，什么样的政策，以及日益激烈的竞争对工作增加劳动力市场的整体功能。因此支出的工作效益和其他措施，鼓励残疾人找工作可作为劳动力市场的有效性的投资，而不仅仅是对国家像传统的伤残福利的财政负担。这个扩展的工作效益是不同的